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From TArlABAşI To GezI ANd BeYoNd: 
The 2013 EVEnT IN The ConjunCTuRE 
oF NeolIBerAl TImes
ABsTrACT
Drawing on ethnographic material from Istanbul prior and during the Gezi uprising 
of 2013, the present article examines the mass demonstrations that broke out in 
more than 90 cities in Turkey and lasted for about a month as an event in the sense 
of the short duration of history (évènement) informed by historical processes of 
medium length duration (conjoncture) marked by authoritarianism and protest; an 
event bearing the inevitability of rupture that long-term authoritarianism carries 
to the present and also the future; a product of a culture of protest traced back to 
the 1980s and the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish economy. Furthermore, 
the paper discusses the rise of the electoral influence of the Democratic People’s 
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi - HDP) as a symptom of the same historical 
conjuncture. 
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Αιμιλία Βουλβούλη
Πριν και Πέρα αΠό Τό Γκέζι: 
Τό συμΒΑν Τόυ 2013 σΤό ισΤόρικό Πλαισιό
Τησ νέόφιλέλέυθέρησ συγκυρίΑσ
ΠέριληΨη
To άρθρο είναι βασισμένο σε εθνογραφική έρευνα που πραγματοποιήθηκε 
κατά την διάρκεια της εξέγερσης του γκεζί το καλοκαίρι του 2013, καθώς 
και σε υποστηρικτικό εθνογραφικό υλικό που συλλέχθηκε πριν αλλά και 
μετά την εξέγερση. Αντλώντας θεωρητική πλαισίωση από το θεωρητικό 
σχήμα του Φ. μπροντέλ, η εξέγερση του γκεζί προσεγγίζεται ως ένα ‘συμ-
βάν’ (event) σύντομης χρονικής διάρκειας αποτέλεσμα ιστορικών διαδικα-
σιών ‘μεσαίας χρονικής διάρκειας’ (conjuncture). Ένα ιστορικό γεγονός το 
οποίο φέρει τη σφραγίδα δεκαετιών αυταρχισμού που οδήγησε στο ξέσπα-
σμα του καλοκαιριού του 2013 με παρελθοντικές αναφορές στην κουλτού-
ρα των διαμαρτυριών της δεκαετίας του 1980 και της απαρχής της νεοφιλε-
λεύθερης αναδόμησης της τουρκικής οικονομίας αλλά και με μελλοντικές 
προεκτάσεις που σχετίζονται με την ανάδυση του αριστερού, προ-κουρ-
δικού κόμματος της Δημοκρατίας των Λαών (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 
- HDP) ως σύμπτωμα της συγκεκριμένης ιστορικής συγκυρίας. 
Λέξεις κλειδιά: Εξέγερση του γκεζί, συμβάν, μεσαία χρονική διάρ-
κεια, νεοφιλελευθερισμός, διαμαρτυρία
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INTrodUCTIoN1
social protests in Turkey about issues of environmental and cultural herit-
age interest (Bartu, 1999; Arsel, 2003; Voulvouli, 2009), as well as issues 
concerning the right to the city (Voulvouli, 2009; Yalçıntan and Çavusoğlu, 
2009), the privatization of the commons (Warner, 2012), and gentrification 
projects (Bartu, 1999; lovering and Turkmen, 2011) have played a crucial 
role in shaping the political2 discourse. An example of how influential 
their role has been, is the Gezi demonstrations that took place nationwide 
during the summer of 2013 and gained worldwide attention due to their 
mass character and also because they were recorded as the first challenge 
to the hegemony of the Justice and development Party that had been rul-
ing for more than a decade. The demonstrations initially took place as an 
opposition to the demolition of Gezi Park, a small park in the middle of 
Taksim square, as part of an urban regeneration plan to reconstruct the 
ottoman military barracks that existed in the area until the middle of the 
20th century and the construction of cultural centers: an opera house as well 
as shopping facilities (radikal, 2011). however, in the course of the days 
that followed the initial protests it became evident that the cutting of the 
trees that triggered the initial demonstration was not the only reason for 
this massive uprising. 
In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate that the Gezi uprising 
was the ‘product’ of decades of campaigning against neoliberal policies. 
even though those campaigns have been less visible - as they were much 
smaller and localized – they involved meanings, values and claims much 
wider than their displays. In addition, their rhetoric resembles the rhetoric 
that we have seen articulated during the 2013 uprising. Within this frame-
work, the Gezi outburst should be examined as an event in the Braudelian 
sense of the term of short duration of history (évènement) informed by 
1. Note on transliteration: The Turkish alphabet is derived from the latin alphabet with 
a few modifications that alter the pronunciation of the letters ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş and ü. In this paper, I 
choose to use the Turkish letters rather than replace them with their latin originals in order to 
be in accordance with the phonetic requirements of the language of my informants. The reader 
should be aware that the pronunciation of the above letters is as following: c is pronounced like 
the english –j, ç is pronounced like the english –ch, ğ serves to lengthen the vowel preceding 
it, ı is pronounced roughly like the –er combination in some english words, ö is pronounced 
like the vowel in the english word ‘bird’ but shorter, ş is pronounced like the english –sh, ü is 
pronounced as the vowel -i but with rounded lips (rona, 1999).
2. see also the documentary ‘Kent suçları, Kent düşleri’ http://www.mimarist.org/vid-
eo-galeri/video/latest/kent-suclari-kent-dusleri.html
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historical processes of medium length duration (conjoncture) concerning 
recent historical processes marked by authoritarianism and protest. 
I employ the Braudelian three-tiered model of historical time (Brau-
del, 1972) and his analysis of évènementsas results of conjonctures not so 
much as opposed to the analysis of évènements that morin, lefort and Cas-
toriadis (1968) construed regarding the may 1968 events in France, as a 
breach, an interruption in the supposed linearity of time. on the contrary, I 
too, as other scholars who have reflected on Gezi, believe that the events of 
those days were not planned or pre-organized (Yıldırım and Navaro-Yasin, 
2013). however, I claim that the events of Gezi can be construed histori-
cally on the basis of an anthropological attempt for an interpretation based 
on the connections of the past that the activists of such mobilizations chose 
to create3.
In other words, the Gezi uprising, as much as being a ‘surprise’ (Nava-
ro-Yashin, 2013a; ercan and oğuz, 2014) due to its spontaneity, heteroge-
neity, creativity and potential, was also an event bearing the inevitability 
of rupture that long-term authoritarianism carries in the present and also 
in the future as the product of a culture of protest traced back in the 1980s 
when the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish economy began. 
In this paper, I will attempt to exemplify this culture of protest by using 
ethnographic material from my fieldwork in Istanbul concerning an urban 
struggle against the construction of the third Bosphorus bridge, by drawing 
on similar cases of protest as well as on ethnographic material produced 
during the Gezi demonstrations. Finally, I suggest that the rise of the elec-
toral influence of the democratic People’s Party (Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi - HDP) is also a symptom of this historical conjuncture. 
The TUrKIsh CoNJUNCTUre
Between 2002 and 2004 I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Istanbul 
with a group of activists protesting against the construction of a bridge 
crossing over the Bosphorus strait. ‘have you heard about Bedrettin da-
lan?’ asked me one of my informants during one of our discussions. ‘No, 
I have not’, I replied to him. ‘he was the mayor of Istanbul in the 1980s. 
he destroyed the city’. ‘What did he do?’ I asked. ‘many things, you can 
search the Chamber of Architects archive. You will find interesting materi-
3. on the connection of Gezi protestors with the past see also Navaro-Yashin (2013) and 
Abbas and Yiğit (2014).
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al about his time in office’. during my fieldwork, this name came up many 
timesas a synonym of the ‘destruction of the beauties of old Istanbul’, in 
the words of another informant. 
Bedrettin dalan was the mayor of Istanbul between 1984 and 1989 in 
the aftermath of perhaps the cruelest and most bloodshed military coup in 
the history of the country, which took place on september 12th, 1980. dur-
ing the coup thousands of people were imprisoned and hanged and all the 
leaders of the political parties were incarcerated or banned from politics. 
As new political parties were formed, 20,000 out of 38,354 NGos were 
closed down (şimşek, 2004) and the remaining unions, voluntary organ-
izations, and institutions were depoliticized (Beşpınar-ekici and Gökalp, 
2006).It paved the way for the implementation of the neoliberal dogma 
of the so-called Chicago school of economics4 under the guidance of the 
World Bank and the ImF (Öniş, 1997). some of the characteristics of this 
policy were the privatization of public spaces, the construction of huge 
architectural structures, such as apartment blocks and shopping malls5, as 
well as mega-structures, such as hydroelectric dams (Voulvouli, 2009) and 
nuclear power plants (martin, 2000), which is still what is occurring in the 
country. 
It is important to further investigate the period of the evren6 coup for 
two reasons. The first is that Turkey, along with Great Britain, were the two 
countries in europe that first adopted the neoliberal dogma, the results of 
which generated a prolonged dissent that escalated in 2013 during the Gezi 
uprising. The second is that during that period the beneficiaries of these 
policies played a major role in the rise to power of the ruling Justice and 
development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi –AKP) and its hegemonic 
consolidation, which was targeted and challenged during the 2013 demon-
strations. 
4. The Chicago school of economics is associated with the neoclassical economic model, 
which rejects the Keynesian economic policies that were implemented as a response to the Great 
depression of 1929 and favored state investments in order to stimulate the economy. on the 
contrary, the economic doctrine of the Chicago school, also known as the neoliberal dogma of 
economy, favors ‘free market’ economy with no, or minimal state intervention.
5. Istanbul ranks fifth in the world in terms of the number of shopping malls that exist in 
the city (http://www.aktifhaber.com/istanbul-avmde-dunya-5si-oldu-782560h.htm.) 
6. Kenan evren, who passed away recently (may 2015), was an army officer convicted to 
life imprisonment on account of his leadership in the military coup of 1980 and his subsequent 
Presidency of the republic of Turkey during the junta, a period also known as the ‘september 
12th coup’.
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As ziya Öniş (1997) writes, the strengthening of political Islam in much 
of the middle east – Turkey included – is intrinsically linked to neoliber-
alism. In the 1980s, during and after the coup Turkey experienced the cre-
ation of a new bourgeoisie, the so-called ‘Anatolian bourgeoisie’, which in 
the 1990s evolved into what came to be known as the ‘Anatolian tigers’, 
a group of conservative entrepreneurs that backed the electoral success of 
the Islamist oriented Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP) (Öniş 2001)which 
is considered to be the predecessor of AKP. It is the same constituency that 
backed the rise in power of AKP not only financially, but also through an 
ideological framework, which involved a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’, that 
is a ‘mixture of nationalism and Islam, as a firm barrier against potential 
sources of instability’ (Öniş, 1997, p. 750).
As it is recorded, during the junta the Quran has been used as an ideo-
logical reference by the dictators. Kenan evren himself, delivered speech-
es with the holy book in one hand (Karaveli, 2008) advocating for a kind 
of Islamic Protestantism7. This image of evren with the Quran in his hand 
and the free market policies of his successor Turgut Özal who was also 
overtly expressive of his Islamic identity (heper, 2013) brings to mind a 
version of the Weberian ‘protestant ethic’ that is, the use of Islam as an 
idiom prompting people to engage in financial activity within a framework 
of ‘disenchanted’ Islamic values.8 
hence, neoliberal restructuring, combined with this kind of Islamic 
Protestantism, paved the way for the ascendance to power of a political 
party that had the characteristics of what its president until recently, re-
cep Tayyip erdoğan, had described as a conservative party along the lines 
of the european Christian democratic parties. At the economic level the 
victory of AKP did not change much. Flexibility of production and a new 
strain in the relationships between capitalists and the working class (Çelik, 
2013; ercan and oğuz, 2014) were some of the changes that the erdoğan 
administration pushed for. Furthermore, a new wave of privatizations and 
7. For a detailed analysis on the ‘protestant ethic’ of Islam and its relation to colonialism 
see Turner (1974). For a study on the Turkish version of Islamist Calvinism see european sta-
bility Initiative (2005) and also mclean (2014). In anthropology, for an analysis of Islam as a 
protestant kind of religiosity see Tsibiridou (2015) also Willis and mohammed (2010) on how 
capitalist wage labourrelations are framed by Islamic “spirits”.
8. As historian rıfat Bali (2001) describes, during an official visit to Tunisia, Turgut Özal, 
while presenting a copy of the Quran to the prime minister of the country suggested that “rich 
muslims are better than poor muslims”.
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state withdrawal from public services came to be added to the previous 
similar policies of the 1980s and the 1990s (ercan and oğuz, 2014).
Nevertheless, as much as the strengthening of Political Islam can be 
studied as a result of neoliberal restructuring, so can the rise of a con-
stituency that had no place in mainstream politics but on the street, in 
the neighborhoods, in small local initiatives and protests with seemingly 
NImBY9 origin. such activism encompassed groups such as those react-
ing against the ‘Tarlabaşı demolitions’, against the construction of mega 
structures in the heart of Istanbul, against the Bergama goldmine, the dams 
of the southeastern Anatolian part of the country, the Bosphorus bridg-
es, especially against the third bridge and many more (sachs, 1997; Öncü 
and Koçan, 2001; 2002; Arsel, 2003; Özdemir, 2003; Beşpınar-ekici and 
Gökalp, 2006; Voulvouli, 2009). 
The narrative of murat, one of the anti-bridge activists, helps us form 
an idea of the character of such collectivities. At the time of my fieldwork 
murat was 60 years old; A left-wing intellectual, who had experienced ‘too 
many coup d’ états’, as he once told me. ‘The last one, the one of septem-
ber 12th (the coup d’ état of 1980) was by far the worst. I left Turkey then, 
I was living in exile and I only came back when I felt safe. I watched my 
country being taken away and this is exactly how I feel now. It’s like my 
place is being taken away. This time I am not going anywhere. I will stay 
and fight’. such narratives reveal that these protests, which occurred over 
the span of the last four decades were not issue-specific mobilizations. on 
the contrary, these mobilizations situated their claims in the framework of 
wider societal issues such as the opposition against military authoritarian-
ism, neo-liberal policies, human-rights protection, feminism, sexuality and 
ethnic minorities rights, environment as a social issue and a public good, 
the right to the city and democratization (Voulvouli, 2009). 
From The ‘TArlABAşI demolITIoNs’  
To The ‘TAKsİm CommUNe’
The conflict over the urban regeneration of Taksim did not start with the 
plans to demolish Gezi Park in 2013. The conflict dates back to the 1980s 
when the metropolitan municipality of Istanbul and the Chamber of Archi-
9. NImBY is an acronym standing for not In My Back Yard that describes the situation in 
which residents of an area oppose a development because they find it damaging for their place 
and propose its construction elsewhere (Wolsink, 1994).
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:15:04 |
64 AImIlIA VoUlVoUlI
tects clashed over, the so called, ‘Tarlabaşı demolitions’. The municipali-
ty had planned the transformation of one of the main streets of the Beyoğlu 
district of the city, İstiklal Caddesi(Independence street) that extends from 
Taksim square to the Galata neighborhood, into a pedestrian street and the 
opening of a parallel artery, which would ease traffic congestion. For this 
construction to occur, a large number of 19th century buildings would have 
to be demolished, as it finally happened. The project was part of the urban 
renewal policy of the neoliberal era that Turkey had entered in the 1980s. 
As (Bartu, 1999) describes in her work regarding the ‘Tarlabaşı demoli-
tions’, the objections related to the realization of the project did not merely 
represent a clash between conservationists and modernizers, but involved 
more complex and multi-layered meanings. It was a debate between the 
left and the authoritarian governance of the 1980s, a debate even between 
leftist circles, between those who considered themselves the real Istanbu-
lites and the outsiders, between the cosmopolitans and the nationalists, the 
Islamists and the secularists. 
What makes the story of the urban renewal of Beyoğlu (the greater area 
in which Taksim belongs) more interesting for the purpose of this paper 
is the fact that the debate regarding the regeneration of the area continued 
over the course of the next decade when the mayor of Istanbul was none 
other than recep Tayyip erdoğan, who in 1994 supported the Islamist ori-
ented Welfare Party’s proposal to construct a muslim cultural center and 
a mosque pretty much where the reconstruction of the military barracks 
and the new shopping mall was supposed to be constructed in 2013. That 
project was abandoned after the shutdown of the Party and the removal of 
recep Tayyip erdoğan from office10. 
The ‘Tarlabaşı demolitions’ is one of the cases on which this paper 
draws. some further characteristic examples will be mentioned below for 
the sake of the economy of the discussion. The reader however, should bear 
in mind that these cases represent only a small percentage of the grassroots 
groups that have been and are still active all over the country11. 
10. on February 28, 1997, a military intervention was staged in order to put a halt in what 
the Turkish Constitutional Court later defined as violations of the government against the secu-
lar constitutional order of the Turkish state (Öniş, 2001). The intervention was characterized as 
a ‘velvet coup’ due to its peaceful resolution after the resignation of the Prime minister Necmet-
tin erbakan who was leading a coalition government between the Welfare (Refah Partisi) and 
the True Path (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP) Parties, widely known as Refahyol government. 
11. see Voulvouli (2009) and Knudsen (2015). Also see http://www.dw.com/en/protests-
as-turkey-builds-first-nuclear-power-plant/a-18383884; http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/
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one of these groups is the one formed during the 1990s in an Aegean 
community of the country, which is known by the name ‘Bergama Protest’. 
The case concerns the conflict between the residents of the Bergama area 
near Izmir and the Normandy mining Corporation. It centers on the pro-
ject for the establishment of a goldmine whose method of gold extraction 
involves the use of cyanide, an element dangerous for public health. The 
opposing residents reacted in various ways and they even managed to get 
the case to the Turkish Constitutional Court, which temporarily revoked 
the company’s license. The Bergama case has been examined as a case of 
multi-layered governance, as a human-rights protest and as a case of envi-
ronmental activism (Öncü and Koçan, 2001; 2002; Arsel, 2003).
 similar issues form the basis of other conflicts such as the ‘İlisu dam’ 
case (Warner, 2012) that concerns the governmental decision to construct a 
dam that would flood the city of İlisu, which is of historical and archaeolog-
ical significance and that would constrain the relocation of a great number 
of people. According to those who opposed the building of the dam, the 
results of its construction were threatening to the local cultural heritage 
(KhrP, 1999). like the Tarlabaşı and the Bergama cases, the İlisu dam 
opposition, involved more issues than environmental and cultural heritage 
protection, as the area, populated mainly by Kurdish people, is a symbol 
of Kurdish culture and resistance against the Turkish state. A similar case 
is the ‘Tunceli Anti-dam’ case, which is also a protest in a mainly Kurd-
ish-populated area (Voulvouli, 2009). The Tunceli province is known for its 
socialist and anti-government groups, a fact suggesting that the opposition 
to the dam was part of a wider, in terms of claims, opposition. In fact, it is 
the first province in Turkish history that in 2014 elected a mayor in the town 
of ovacık who is a member of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Kö-
munist Partisi - TKP). similarly, the Arnavutköy anti-bridge campaign is a 
conflict involving much more than the objection to the bridge construction.
The ‘ThIrd BrIdGe’ ProTesT
The ‘Third Bridge’ case bears similarities with the ‘Tarlabaşı demolitions’ 
as until 1997 the debate of whether or not a third Bosphorus crossing (3. 
Boğaz Geçisi) was necessary, was limited to the ministry of Public Works 
turkey-suspends-contested-gold-mine-project-after-protests-1280935, as well as the docu-
mentaries ‘ekümenopolis: Ucu olmayan şehir’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maecPK-
BXV0m) and ‘Anadolu’nun İsyanı’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmi33j5mXzm) 
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and settlements and certain bureaucrats such as Bedrettin dalan (see 
above) on the one side, and the Chamber of Architects on the other. The 
former claimed that the crossing was necessary whereas the latter claimed 
that not only was it not necessary, but that it was harmful as far as traffic 
congestion was concerned (Voulvouli, 2009). 
In November 1998, newspapers reported that the ministry of Public 
Works and settlements was planning the construction of a third bridge 
which would connect the european with the Asian sides of Bosphorus. The 
bridge would rest in Arnavutköy(european side) and Kandilli (Asian side). 
Almost immediately after the construction of the third bridge had been 
announced an initiative by residents of Arnavutköy was formed, namely 
the Arnavutköy district Initiative (Arnavutköy Semt Girişimi - ASG). ever 
since, weekly meetings have been taking place, press releases have been 
printed, festivals (panayır) have been held as well as dinners, tea-parties 
and educational panels on the effects that the bridge would have on the 
neighborhood’s life. In addition, a project about the oral history of the 
area has been launched. All these activities aimed at increasing awareness 
of the area’s important cultural and architectural history as well as of the 
destructive effects of the construction of the bridge. The arguments sup-
porting this claim revolved mainly around the effects that the construction 
of the bridge would have on the environment. however, within the context 
of this discourse ASG involved issues of natural and cultural heritage pres-
ervation as well as demands for democratic participation and human rights 
protection (Voulvouli, op.cit).
In this sense, the anti-bridge protest was not just an environmental pro-
test, but a transenvironmental one. That is, ‘collective action that goes be-
yond the narrow environmental definition of the issue at stake allowing the 
environment to carry with it more meanings than just the narrow one of 
doing something good to nature’ (Kousis and eder, 2001, p. 11)12. over the 
course of its life ASG involved collective consumption demands, promoted 
community culture and connected with the wider society through media, 
professionals and political parties. Furthermore, it rendered the issue public 
by having issued press releases and launching an Internet website. Foreign 
newspapers published articles on the ASG struggle, ICoMoS (Internation-
al Council on monuments and sites) listed Arnavutköy as herITAGe @
RISK, national and foreign NGos were supportive of the campaign, and 
12. About environmental protests that transcend the environmental issues at stake see also 
Arsel et al. (2015). 
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scientists, politicians and celebrities declared their opposition to the con-
struction of the bridge (Voulvouli, 2009). 
In the context of the ‘Third Bridge’protest, the encounters that took 
place were multifaceted and multileveled. leftists, secularists, social-dem-
ocrats and right-wing individuals, along with liberals, conservatives, 
straight, lGBT, upper middle class, working class, celebrities, cosmopoli-
tans and localists, intellectuals, artists, and even bureaucrats were actively 
or less actively involved in the struggle. In this sense, the participation of 
all the different subgroups within ASG came together wishing to challenge 
existing public services (lowe, 1986) as response to authoritarian ruling. 
As one of my informants put it:
‘All the governments have tried to change the country and the city 
according to the needs that car usage creates, whereas the opposite 
should have been done […] At some point those who rule this country, 
must understand that people, all Turkish people should be heard and 
their opinion should be a factor in their decision making’. 
The 2000 financial crisis was a perfect alibi for the continuation of the 
same policies that resulted in what has been characterized as the ‘Turkish 
financial miracle’, exemplified in the expansion of the construction sector 
which in many cases blurs the limits of private and public spaces. The Gezi 
Park urban renewal is an example of such policies. 
The eVeNT oF GezI: her Yer TAKsİm, her Yer dİreNİş 
(eVerYWhere TAKsIm, eVerYWhere resIsTANCe) 
In 2011, the Istanbul metropolitan municipality decided to go ahead with 
the plans of the urban regeneration of Taksim square. opposing these plans, 
an initiative called Taksim Platform (Taksim Platformu) was created. on the 
website of the initiative in the ‘about us’ section, it is mentioned that the Tak-
sim Platform is an initiative of ‘people who live, enjoy, work and pass from 
Taksim, people who consider Taksim as the center of the city, people from all 
age groups and walks of life, men, women, architects, and local groups’.13 In 
2012, the Platform along with dozens of other groups participated in a net-
work of groups under the name Taksim solidarity (Taksim dayanışması) 
and as such they issued a joint statement14 to declare their opposition to 
13. http://www.taksimplatformu.com/bizkimiz.php
14. http://bianet.org/system/uploads/1/files/attachments/000/000/506/original/TAKsİm_dAYA 
NIşmAsI_orTAK_deKlArAsYoNU.pdf
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the announced plans of the government concerning the urban renewal of 
Taksim. In the statement it was also announced that their actions were co-
ordinated by the Istanbul Chamber of Architects, an institution involved in 
both the ‘Tarlabaşı’ and the ‘Third Bridge’ conflicts (see above).
In may 2013, participants of the Taksim solidarity in an effort to pre-
vent the initiation of the project occupied Gezi Park by organizing a sit-in. 
In fact, some of my informants who were amongst the occupiers or the 
çapulcular (looters), as the Prime-minister at the time, recep Tayyip er-
doğan, had called them - an epithet by which they became known during 
the following days all over the world - invited me to join them. I was not 
in Istanbul during those first days so I could not be there, it was however 
my understanding that the occupation was peaceful. Whilst I was away 
on the night of the 28th of may news spread that what my informants had 
described as a peaceful sit-in had evolved into a violent clash with the 
police that attacked the occupiers of Gezi with tear gas, water cannons and 
plastic bullets. over the next month massive demonstrations burst all over 
the country, police brutality (no stranger to the square)15 reached its peak, 
demonstrators were killed, many were injured16 and people involved in the 
protests lost their jobs. however, at the same time the çapulcular set tents 
in Gezi park, run open-air libraries (açık hava kütüphanesi), organized 
book readings, small concerts and other recreational activities, had tents 
for praying (mescit) and organized many practical jokes against the police 
forces. In fact humor and carnivalesque happenings played a big part in the 
otherwise violent events of those days. ‘ (humor) helps us cope’ a friend 
told me as we were privately conversing on Facebook. 
ever since, the protest has been the subject of study of many scholars 
both within the Turkish and the international Academia. Gezi has been 
analyzed as a collective movement and a symbol of protest against neo-
liberalism (Farro and demirhisar, 2014); as a transformative event in Tur-
key’s political landscape (Türkmen, 2015), as a symptom of modernization 
(Taştan, 2013), as grassroots populism (Özen, 2015), as anti-capitalist re-
15. many incidents are related to Taksim square as it is the place where almost all demon-
strations take place. one of the most well known demonstrations in the history of the square 
is the 1977 labor day rally when 34 demonstrators were assassinated by right-wing extremist 
snipers (mango, 2004).
16. one of those injured during the first days of the demonstrations was the Istanbul dep-
uty sırrı süreyya Önder of the pro-Kurdish Peace and democracy Party (Bariş ve Demokrasi 
Partisi – BDP), who later became one of the main components of HDP when he was reportedly 
standing in front of bulldozers, trying to stop the uprooting of trees.
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sistance against the commodification of urban space, nature and everyday 
life (ercan and oğuz, 2014); Gezi as an evidence of the confiscation of 
public space by private capital (Göle, 2013; Voulvouli, 2013a) and a pure 
anti-government protest (Yörük and Yüksel, 2014); Gezi as a secularist 
protest (Atay, 2013), an ad hoc uprising, horizontally and non-hierarchi-
cally organized (Yıldırım and Navaro – Yashin, 2013; Yıldırım, 2013) with 
heterogeneous encounters (Navaro-Yashin, 2013a; Özen, 2015); Gezi as 
a political process in liminal spaces (Gambetti, 2013), a protest against 
biopolitical authoritarianism (Avramopoulou, 2013; Voulvouli, 2013b), a 
protest claiming the right to the city (sopov, 2013; Voulvouli, 2013c) and 
a resistance that bears the imprint of the 1980s oppression (Navaro – Yas-
hin, 2013b).
I agree with all the above interpretations of the Gezi uprising. my eth-
nographic experience of those days suggests that it was indeed a heter-
ogeneous encounter of all sorts of people. From secularists to anti-cap-
italist muslims, from leftists to liberal and more conservative circles of 
people, from working class to upper class individuals, students, professors, 
intellectuals, celebrities, artists, politicians, unionists, environmentalists, 
lGBT and feminist activists. Gezi was an encounter of the ‘we’ in every 
possible synthesis against what sydney Tarrow (1998) calls a ‘common 
enemy’. It was clear for those who experienced Gezi that the demonstra-
tions did not occur because of the trees that were cut. The cutting of those 
trees was the tip of the iceberg. What happened in Turkey in 2013 was the 
performance of anger that had been accumulated for decades. 
The case of Kemal, a left-wing activist with whom I met during the pro-
tests, is characteristic. his father was member of a marxist group during 
the 1970s and had been persecuted and incarcerated during the evren era. 
Kemal has always been active politically, especially during his years as an 
undergraduate student in one of Turkey’s progressive universities. Kemal’s 
narrative of Gezi was not focusing only on the suppression and police bru-
tality during the days of the uprising, or during the erdoğan era. ‘It has 
always been us, it has always been the leftists who have been targeted. In 
the 1970s, in the 1980s we have always been suppressed, chased and mar-
ginalized’. From the other end of the spectrum of people who participated 
in Gezi, Aslı a postgraduate headscarved student told me ‘in this country, 
women are always the victim. They are always affraid that one government 
will put a scarf on their head and the other will take it off’. With this narra-
tive, Aslı referred to the headscarf issue that has permeated public discour-
se in Turkey for decades regarding the ban of the headscarf in public sector 
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jobs and in universities and the fear of secular women that an Islamist 
government would legally constrain all women to wear a headscarf. 
The different groups that participated in the Gezi protests agreed on 
their disapproval of authoritarianism, religious or not. ‘We expect from the 
government to respect our individual and collective rights as well as the 
right to the city’ stated Turkish anthropologist, leyla Neyzi when speaking 
to the Canadian network CBC. ‘People won’t go away. In the past, the po-
lice could disperse people around with gas bombs and water cannons but 
this time it’s different. This time people won’t back out’. ‘Today is monday 
17th of June. Police has managed to break our block and the crossing of 
Gezi is under police control. however, we will not surrender. The Takism 
Commune existed even if only for two weeks’ posted a Facebook friend 
to be followed by another one who wrote that ‘for two weeks we realized 
our right to the city with solidarity and self-denial’. ‘even though the third 
bridge will not be constructed in Arnavutköy we are not happy. We did not 
want it to be built anywhere’ told me one of my ASG informants who was 
present in Gezi during the uprising.
As Paul durrenberger argues: ‘The states in serving the interests of 
corporations are unable to serve the interests of their citizens by protect-
ing their environments or ensuring their economic welfare. In democrat-
ic states, those in which citizens elect governments, this causes tensions. 
There is a tension between the interests of corporations and the interests of 
populations. That is what we see playing out in the process of globalization 
as numbers of people gather from around the world to protest wherever 
international bodies meet to discuss policies of world trade. If we want 
to understand these movements and their manifestations from protest to 
suicidal attacks, we must understand the system that gives rise to them’.
The fact that during the demonstrations banks were attacked either ver-
bally or physically, the existence of banners against neo-liberal policies, 
the active presence of anti-capitalist groups amongst which the group of 
anti-capitalist muslims, as well as of the leftist parties of the country, sug-
gests that Gezi was an anti-neoliberal protest against the mechanisms that 
turn labor to bank profits, minimize the right to the city, destroy the envi-
ronment, suppress human rights in the name of a disenchanted neo-con-
servatism ‘headscarved’ with religious legitimation. 
Burak, a young anarchist from Izmir studying in Istanbul, was very 
emotional when he was shouting about the right to the city (kent hakkı). 
‘This is not yours to sell’, he told me referring to the prime minister who, 
according to him, was privatising public spaces following the tradition of 
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all governments since the 1980s. ‘It does not matter whether it is a coali-
tion, a secularist or an Islamist minister. They all say yes to the bridge! All 
of them serve private interests’, one of my informants told me, when I was 
doing my fieldwork regarding the third bridge. 
Taking the above into consideration, I claim that Gezi was not the first 
challenge against neo-liberal authoritarianism. even though the coup of 
the 1980s appeared to have eradicated almost every opposition, on the 
level of what anthropologists call social poetics (herzfeld, 2005), that is, 
the appropriation of meanings in order to meet certain ends, there has been 
a ‘silent’ battle against authoritarianism and neoliberalism from collectiv-
ities in both urban and rural areas. 
Causes such as environmental, cultural heritage and human rights pro-
tection, democracy, justice and equality have been appropriated within the 
Turkish neoliberal conjuncture creating thus a culture of protest, which has 
been channeled through time and took on a massive manifestation in the 
summer of 2013 during the Gezi uprising.
Gezi (évènement) was the big scale parallel of Tarlabaşı, Bergama, 
İlisu, Tunceli, Arnavutköy and many more protests around the country. 
heterogeneous encounters, democratization demands, human and political 
rights protection claims, anti-capitalist, feminist and lGBT agendas syn-
thesize a constituency that exists in almost every corner of Turkey, born 
at the same time as the neoliberal state. ‘everywhere Taksim, everywhere 
resistance’ was one of the most popular slogans during the uprising amidst 
tear gas, water cannons, but also carnivalesque events, open-air libraries, 
music, humor. The ‘Taksim Commune’, as some of the protesters called 
the days of the uprising, brought to my mind one of the comments that an 
ASG activist had made during one of their festivals: ‘Is this a revolution or 
what?’. I am not at all certain that we can speak in terms of a revolution or 
a repetition of the Paris Commune in the heart of Istanbul. It is, however, 
my belief that the Gezi uprising would not have been possible without the 
existence of those small in size but big in number protests that have been 
flourishing during this historical conjuncture.
From GezI To The PArlIAmeNT: Bİz’ler meClİse  
(We, IN The PArlIAmeNT) 
In his victory speech after the June 7th 2015 elections, the co-president of 
HDP, selahattin demirtaş said that ‘this victory is a shared victory of the 
workers, the unemployed, villagers, farmers, women, the oppressed, the 
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exploited, hence it is a victory of the left’. This statement was along the 
lines of the main campaign slogan of HDP in the pre-election period which 
was ‘We, in the Parliament’ (Biz’ler meclise). HDP is a party which had 
been founded a year before the Gezi uprising and had managed to cross the 
10% threshold, a necessary condition for a party before any of its elective 
representatives can enter the Turkish National Assembly. ‘We did it! For 
more than thirty years they had managed to keep us out of the parliament’ 
told me one of my informants’ referring to the fact that the 10% threshold 
law was introduced with the constitution of the military junta in the 1980s. 
The accomplishment of HDP is seen by many of its supporters as a vindi-
cation of decades of dissent to authoritarian suppression, democratic in-
terruption and conservatism, which resulted in the marginalization of pro-
gressive groups from the mainstream political scene. The party managed 
to capitalize on a general sentiment in the aftermath of Gezi and its attempt 
was ‘applauded’ initially, at the Presidential elections of August 2014 by 
an impressive 9.76% of the votes17. later on, in the national elections, 
hdP won 13,1% in June and 10.7% in November of the constituency, who 
went beyond the dichotomies of the past with regards to the Kurdish issue 
and judged HDP not only as a pro-Kurdish party, which it undoubtedly is, 
but also as a progressive, liberal, leftist movement with two leaders from 
the new pool of the political personnel of the country, namely selahattin 
demirtaş and Figen Yüksedağ, a man and a woman. This representation 
respected the 50% quota rule in the participation of women in the party’s 
committees and procedures, a quota which was also respected during the 
formation of the electoral lists along with quotas applied for participation 
of lGBT individuals, religious as well as ethnic minorities18.
In this sense, HDP positions itself as not yet another pro-Kurdish po-
litical party, but a multi-issue political formation; a political organization 
focusing on issues of class inequality, feminist and gender prerogatives, 
political suppression, human rights, democratic participation, as well as al-
ternative governance. That is, many of the demands and claims of the Gezi 
protesters but also of decades of dissent by social movements constituted 
by all those grassroots initiatives, student and labor movements, smaller 
leftist political collectivities and parties. 
17. Considering that selahattin demirtaş who was the party’s candidate for the Presidency, 
is of Kurdish origin, this number was indeed very impressive.
18. on the rise of HDP as a consequence of the Gezi uprising see also Türkmen (2015).
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‘The emphasis is on ‘we’ that includes all the oppressed. Kurds, workers, 
Alevis, Armenians, unemployed, poor, youth, women, lGBT etc.’
mentioned one of my informants, a high-ranking member of HDP, when I 
asked him why they used ‘We, in the Parliament’ as their central campaign 
motto before the June elections. 
At the November 1st 2015 snap elections HDP lost a significant number 
of the votes it had gained in June. According to my informants, this was the 
result of the violence that followed the June elections (suicide bombings 
in a peace rally in Ankara and in a youth gathering in suruç a city in the 
southeast part of the country and the retaliation attacks targeting soldiers, 
policemen and villager guards from the militants of the Kurdistan Work-
er’s Party PKK – in Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê). right now, 
Turkey experiences a turbulent period and for some it is on the verge of 
civil war.
About a year ago, Turkish federal prosecutors launched an investiga-
tion against 1,128 academics who have signed a petition calling for peace 
and objecting to the government’s policy in the country’s Kurdish prov-
inces. A few days before that, the President of the republic recep Tayyip 
erdoğan had called for the lifting of immunity for the HDP leaders in order 
for criminal investigations against them to be initiated. Whether, how and 
when this conflict will end remains to be seen. It is not very easy to predict 
but as an ethnographer who tries to communicate the point of view of my 
informants, I feel that the words of one of them during the Gezi uprising 
help us reflect on what the future might bring:
‘Fear has been defeated now. We have learned to raise our voice when 
we are angry. some people are fighting, others are dancing; some are 
lashing out drunk; others are collecting garbage and treating stray 
animals. I do not know what is going to happen tomorrow. But today is 
a new day and we are all new people’19.
19. The authorship of this article was completed before the summer of 2016 and the July 
15th attempted coup that has drastically transformed the Turkish political landscape. during the 
last year, Turkey is experiencing another cycle of authoritarianism and Turks are experiencing 
once more a very intense and difficult period. one of the many risks that students of contempo-
rary Turkish society run while witnessing history in the making is that by the time their papers 
reach the press, Turkey might be a very different country from the one they are describing in 
their writings. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:15:04 |
74 AImIlIA VoUlVoUlI
ACKNoWledGmeNTs: I would like to thank my informants for being 
so willing to ‘let me in’, the editors of this special issue, the anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable comments, as well as Nazlı Usta lazaris and 
Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk for their help during the writing of this paper. 
reFereNCes
Abbas, T. and Yiğit, I.h. (2014). scenes from Gezi Park: localization, nationalism, and 
globalization in Turkey. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 
19(1), pp. 61-76. 
Arsel, m. (2003). risk society at europe’s periphery? The case of the Bergama resistance in 
Turkey. In F. Adaman, F. Göksen, J. Grolin, m. o’ Brien, o. seippel, , e.U. zenginobuz 
(eds), Integrating and articulating environments: A challenge for northern and southern 
Europe (pp. 29-49). leiden: swets and zeitlinger.
Arsel, m. Akbulut, B. and Adaman, F. (2015). environmentalism of the malcontent: Anatomy 
of an anti-coal power plant struggle in Turkey”,The Journal of Peasant Studies,doI: 
10.1080/03066150.2014.971766
Atay, T. (2013). The clash of ‘nations’ in Turkey: reflection on the Gezi Park incident. Insight 
Turkey, 15(3), pp. 39-44. 
Avramopoulou, e. (2013). on the fantasy of dispossession. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology 
website, october 31, https://culanth.org/fieldsights/400-on-the-fantasy-of-
dispossession
Bali, r. (2001). Bir zengin olsaydım!. http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/4366/bir-
zengin-olsaydim#.Wzijx62B3q2. Accessed 26 February 2016.
Bartu, A. (1999). Who owns the old quarters? rewriting histories in global era. In Ç. Keyder, 
(ed.), Istanbul between the global and the local (pp. 31-46). lanham: rowman & littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.
Beşpınar-ekici, U. F. and Gökalp, d. (2006). Power brokers, local beneficiaries and empowering 
the powerless: A critical assessment of the NGos, civil society and democracy in Turkey. 
Paper presented in the Graduate student Conference. Institute for International and regional 
studies, Princeton University, 7-8 April 2006.
Braudel, F. (1972).The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II, vol. 
2. New York: harper and row.
Çelik, A. (2013). Trade unions and de-unionization during ten years of AKP rule. Perspectives,3.
deutsche Welle, (2015). Protests as Turkey builds first nuclear power plant. http://www.
dw.com/en/protests-as-turkey-builds-first-nuclear-power-plant/a-18383884 Accessed 26 
February 2016
durrenberger, e. P. (2003). Global processes, local systems. urban Anthropology, 32 (3-4), pp. 
253-279.
ercan, F. and oğuz, s. (2014). From Gezi resistance to soma massacre: Capital accumulation 
and class struggle in Turkey. Socialist Register, 51, pp. 114-135.
european stability Initiative (2005). Islamic Calvinists: Change and conservatism in central 
Anatolia. Berlin – Istanbul. 
Farro, A.l. and demirhisar, d.G. (2014). The Gezi Park movement: a Turkish experience of 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:15:04 |
 From TArlABAşI To GezI ANd BeYoNd 75
the twenty-first-century collective movements. International Review of Sociology, 24 (1), 
pp. 176-189. 
Gambetti, z. (2013). The politics of visibility. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, 
october 31, 2013. http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/401-the-politics-of-visibility
Göle, N. (2013). Gezi: Anatomy of a public square movement. Insight Turkey, 15 (3), pp. 7-14. 
heper, m. (2013). Islam, conservatism, and democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal 
and recep Tayyip erdoğan. Insight Turkey, 15 (2), pp. 141-156.
herzfeld, m. (2005). Cultural intimacy: Social poetics in the nation state.New York and 
london: routledge.
Karaveli, h. m. (2008). In the shadow of Kenan evren. The Turkey Analyst, 1 (13), https://
www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/135-in-the-shadow-of-
kenan-evren.html
KhrP, (1999). The Ilisu dam: A human rights disaster in the making”, November 1999.
Knudsen, s. (2015). “Protests against energy projects in Turkey: environmental activism above 
politics?. British journal of Middle Eastern Studies, doI: 10.1080/13530194.2015.1102707 
Kousis, m. and K. eder (2001). Introduction: eU policy-making, local action, and the emergence 
of institutions of collective action. A theoretical perspective on southern europe. ιn Kousis, 
m. and K. eder (eds), Environmental Politics in Southern Europe: Actors, institutions and 
discourses in a europeanizing society (pp. 3-21). dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
lovering, J. and Türkmen, h. (2011). Bulldozer neo-liberalism in Istanbul: The state-led 
construction of property markets, and the displacement of the urban poor. International 
Planning Studies, 16 (1), pp. 73-96.
lowe, s. (1986). Urban social movements: The city after Castells. New York, macmillan 
education ltd.
mango, A. (2004). Atatürk: The biography of the founder of modern Turkey. New York: The 
overlook Press.
martin, d.h. (2000).Nuclear threat in the Eastern Mediterranean: The case against Turkey’s 
Akkuyu nuclear plant. ottawa: Nuclear Awareness Project.
mclean, G. (2014). AbdullahGül and the Making of new Turkey. london: oneworld 
Publications.
morin, e., lefort, C., and Castoriadis, C. (1968). Mai 1968: La Brèche. Paris: les éditions 
Fayard.
Navaro-Yashin, Y. (2013a). editorial—Breaking memory, spoiling memorization: The Taksim 
protests in Istanbul. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, october 31. http://
www.culanth.org/fieldsights/411-editorial-breaking-memory-spoiling-
memorization-the-taksim-protests-in-istanbul
Navaro-Yashin,Y. (2013b). shadows of the 1980 coup and the syrian war: resisting in 
Antakya. Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology website, october 31. http://www.culanth.org/
fieldsights/409-shadows-of-the-1980-coup-and-the-syrian-war-resisting-in-antakya
New delhi Television limited, (2016). Turkey suspends contested goldmine project. http://www.
ndtv.com/world-news/turkey-suspends-contested-gold-mine-project-afterprotests-1280935 
Accessed 26 Feb 2016.
Öncü, A. and Koçan, G. (2001). Political identity and citizenship politics. Nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism in the Bergama movement in Turkey. New Perspectives on Turkey, 26, 
pp. 29-57.
— (2002). Democratic citizenship movements in the context of multi-layered governance: The 
case of the Bergama Movement, sabancı University and Bilkent University. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:15:04 |
76 AImIlIA VoUlVoUlI
Öniş, z. (1997). The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: The rise of the welfare 
party in perspective. Third World Quarterly, 18 (4), pp. 743-766. 
Öniş, z. (2001). Political Islam at the crossroads: From hegemony to co- existence. Contemporary 
Politics, 7 (4), pp. 281-298. 
Özdemir, İ. (2003). The development of environmental consciousness in modern Turkey. ιn 
richard Foltz (ed.), Environmentalism in the Muslim World (pp. 17-36), Boston, mIT Press.
Özen, h. (2015). An unfinished grassroots populism: The Gezi Park protests in Turkey and their 
aftermath. South European Society and Politics, 20 (4), pp. 533-552.
radikal (2011). Belediye Taksim meydanı için kararını Verdi.
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